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Devolution was embedded in the 1996 welfare reform. Using the National Survey of 
America’s Families, this article explores the relationship between living in a Second Order 
Devolution (SOD) state and administrative exclusion from a welfare program. Results from 
the logistic model indicate that low-income clients and single mothers living in a SOD state 
had an increased likelihood of administrative exclusion. Administrative exclusion reflects 
bureaucratic choices and rules violations—implying some of these individuals and families 
may be leaving welfare without having achieved self-sufficiency. Results suggest that a 
careful evaluation of the state welfare performance measure and of the devolution of 
authority under block grants are needed before block granting other safety net programs. 
  
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA)—also known as welfare reform—created a block grant system of delivering 
traditional welfare and job assistance programs to the poor. The reform and the resulting 
transition from Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) to Temporary Assistance 
to Needy Families (TANF) decentralized the responsibility of addressing poverty from the 
federal government to states (Blank 2001; Brueckner 2000; Rodgers 2000; Schoeni & Blank 
2000; Ziliak 2015). Many of these states further devolved authority over TANF to local 
policymakers (Gainsborough 2003; Sheely 2012; Kim & Fording 2010). This sub-national 
devolution under welfare reform, also known as the Second Order Devolution (SOD), created 
a unique administrative structure and coincided with incentives for states to reduce their 
caseloads, namely allowing them to reduce their federal work participation requirement 
(Hahn, Kassabian, & Zedlewiski 2012).  
The extant literature shows that that devolution of authority under welfare reform 
reduces state TANF caseload by creating stricter program rules (Kim 2007; Kim & Fording 
2010; Sheely 2013). However, the literature has yet to focus on the effects of this devolution 
on welfare exits at the individual level. This article investigates the relationship between the 
second order devolution (SOD) and administrative exclusion within the welfare governance 
structure. To explore the link between administrative exclusion and SOD, this article focuses 
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on the following research question – Does living in a SOD state increase the likelihood of 
administrative exclusion for a welfare client? Though Sheely (2013) assesses this connection, 
she focuses only on the State of California. The present study uses nationally representative 
data to assess this connection, thus making the results more generalizable. Since the literature 
provides the evidence that states with higher proportions of African American welfare clients 
tend to develop stricter welfare rules (Sheely 2012; Soss, Schram, Fording, & Houser 2009; 
Soss, Schram, Vartanian, & O’Brien 2001), this study also explores the relationship between 
administrative exclusion, SOD, and client race. The study is organized as follows. Section I 
explores the history and state performance measure under PRWORA. Section II discusses 
welfare rules, administrative exclusion, and SOD. Section III describes the data and research 
design. Section IV discusses the results from the empirical analysis. Section V explores policy 
implications, and section VI discusses the limitations of the current study and future work. 
 
History of the PRWORA 
Debates about the social safety net programs are not new in the US. Since the 1950s, many 
debates and revisions have occurred in the development of what is called “welfare policy” 
(Bane & Ellwood 1994; Brodkin 2007; Rodgers 2000; Skocpol 1994). The case-worker 
model of welfare provision was criticized in the 1960s and 1970s (Brodkin 2007) for being a 
punitive and rigid system with very low benefits (Bane & Ellwood 1994). In the 1980s, a new 
direction called for movement from an emphasis on cash assistance to an emphasis on work 
and self-sufficiency (Bane & Ellwood 1994; Dinitto & Johnson 2016; Rodgers 2000). A 
major shift in policy occurred in 1996 with the passage of the PRWORA. The act was the 
culmination of over sixty years of debate and change. Devolution of responsibility for welfare 
programs to states, privatization of social services, and adoption of a new performance 
measure that rewarded reductions in welfare caseload were all consistent with the tenets of 
New Public Management (Lynn 2006; Brodkin 2007). It is also important to note that, during 
the Clinton administration, the focus on “reinventing the government” led to a major overhaul 
of many federal programs. The politics of the “new Democratic coalition” under President 
Clinton (Brodkin 1995; 1999) was an important influence on the overhaul of the welfare 
system, though a detailed exploration of the coalition is outside the scope of the current study. 
 
State Welfare Performance Measure 
Under PRWORA, states are required to have most able-bodied TANF participants engaged 
in work-related activities and to sanction those who fail to meet such requirements.  Though 
states have the discretion to design the rules for who must participate in work and what 
happens if participants fail to comply with requirements, their decisions are mostly influenced 
by the federal work participation rate. The law requires that 50 percent of all TANF families 
must be engaged in work-related activities for 30 hours per week, and 90 percent of two-
parent families must be engaged in work-related activities for 35 hours per week. If a state 
does not meet its work-participation requirement, it faces steep financial penalties, where the 
state TANF grant is reduced, depending upon the severity of non-compliance.  For each state, 
the target work participation requirement equals the difference between the statutory work 
participation rate and the caseload reduction credit a state receives. A state’s caseload 
reduction credit equals the percentage point decline in its average monthly caseload between 
the previous year and the base year of 2005 (Health and Human Services 2017). Given this 
connection between work participation rate and the caseload reduction credit, states have the 
incentive to use caseload reduction as an important output measurement to get clients off the 
welfare caseload, thereby displacing the goal of client economic self-sufficiency.  
2
Journal of Public Management & Social Policy, Vol. 26, No. 1 [2019], Art. 4
https://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/jpmsp/vol26/iss1/4
Journal of Public Management & Social Policy                                                                                                              Spring 2019 
 
- 42 - 
The goal of welfare reform and welfare-to-work programs was to move clients into 
the workforce and off public assistance. This program goal assumed that a recipient would 
find a job and become self-sufficient, and declining caseloads would signal this self-
sufficiency. From 1997 to 2011, the TANF caseload declined by 50 percent nationally. This 
caseload decline varied among the states from 25 to 80 percent (The Urban Institute 2012). 
Receiving the caseload reduction credit encourages states to use both administrative and non-
administrative methods to keep the caseload low, either by removing current clients (through 
work placements or otherwise) or creating a system so difficult to navigate that new welfare 
clients do not enter the system. States have the power to create strict program rules, such as 
full family sanctions, pre-program requirements of job search, strict time limits (less than 60 
months in the federal guidelines), and other restrictions allowed under the broad guidelines 
of TANF (Golden 2005; Rodgers 2000; Rowe & Giannarelli 2006; Ziliak 2015). A very strict 
assessment of a client’s progress can create another barrier to participate in the welfare 
program. 
Under the reform, states received more flexibility in developing and implementing 
their welfare programs. Welfare reform decentralized the welfare system in two steps. First, 
the national government transferred program responsibility to the states via TANF, which is 
referred to as the first order devolution. Second, some states chose to further transfer the 
responsibility of programs to local governments through administrative or funding 
mechanisms—second-order devolution (SOD) (Watson & Gold 1997). Devolution of 
decision making in welfare programs is consistent with federalism and played an important 
role during the 1990s. Under second-order devolution, states delegated more responsibilities 
to local governments and, in some cases, to non-profits and the private sector to better address 
the needs of welfare recipients (Allard 2007; Nathan & Gais 1998; Poole 2003; Whitaker & 
Time 2001). 
 
Welfare Rules, Administrative Exclusion and Devolution  
Rules and Administrative Exclusion 
Administrative exclusion is defined as “nonparticipation attributable to organizational factors 
rather than claimant preferences or substantive eligibility status” (Brodkin & Majmundar 
2010, p. 827).  For example, clients can be sanctioned off a welfare program for “missing 
appointments” or “not filing paperwork” (Cherlin, Bogen, Quane, & Burton 2002). Clients 
find requirements, such as attending an in-person meeting for redetermination of program 
eligibility, as a bureaucratic hassle (Quint, Widom, & Moore 2001). 
Organizational rules and regulations can create a complex welfare system, making 
participation in that system difficult. For example, organizations can set up formal rules for 
program participation, such as requirements to produce documents for verification. These 
documents may not be under the control of the participants, and they may need to collect 
these documents from agencies, such as schools. This type of procedural requirement 
increases the “cost” for the participants to participate in the welfare system (Brodkin & 
Majmundar 2010; Brodkin, Fuqua, & Waxman 2005; Sheely 2013). Welfare offices may also 
require clients to participate in job search activities and provide proof that they have searched 
for jobs for a certain time and with certain employers (Maloy, Pavetti, Shin, Darnel, & 
Scarpulla-Nolan 1998). Such formal rules also increase the “cost” that participants must pay 
(in terms of time and money) to participate in a cash assistance program, and, thereby, can 
dissuade them from continuing their application (Lurie 2001).  
Administrative exclusion can also be exercised through informal rules and procedures 
through caseworker’s discretion, such as making decisions about the adequacy of eligibility 
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documents (e.g., canceled check vs. a note from the property owner as a proof of rent paid 
(Brodkin & Majmundar 2010)).  Welfare participants may leave the welfare rolls completely 
if they fail to satisfy program rules, because these rules are burdensome or considered as a 
“hassle” (Quint, Widom, & Moore 2001). 
Removal due to rule violations is different from the other factors leading to a welfare 
exit, such as a client’s preference for non-participation or an increase in income that changes 
eligibility status, as the latter may signal a transition out of poverty. Hence, it is important to 
make a distinction between administrative and non-administrative welfare exits. 
 
Welfare Reform and Second Order Devolution  
At face value, devolution stands apart from administrative exclusion as a policy choice for 
organizing bureaucracies. The devolution of authority from the federal government to state 
and local governments was embedded in welfare reform. Though many states locally 
administered AFDC programs even before the welfare reform, post-reform the SOD became 
even more pronounced. Devolution created a wide range of TANF programs at state and local 
levels. States adopted policy packages that ranged from minimal provisions—conservative 
approaches that emphasize private responsibility—to integrated approaches that combined 
generous direct assistance with explicit policy commitments to support families and enforce 
family responsibility (De Jong, Graefe, Irving, & Pierre 2006; Meyers, Gornick, & Peck 
2000; Weil & Finegold 2002).  
One motivating assumption behind devolution is that state governments know more 
about the needs of their welfare population and would be able to serve that population better. 
This new welfare governance structure has led to a debate between proponents and opponents 
regarding the potential positive and negative consequences for clients under devolution. 
Proponents of devolution argue that decentralization leads to better programs that are 
specifically targeted toward the populations that localities know better than the federal 
government. States and, more specifically, local governments are aware of the economic and 
social context of the programs, and, thus, can design programs catering to the needs of the 
local welfare population (Kim 2008; Sheely 2010). The opponents of the devolution argue 
that devolving such authority to state and local governments would lead to a “race to the 
bottom” (RTB) via stricter sanctioning policies, shrinking benefits, and more difficult 
program rules. Thus, decentralization would lead to punitive treatment of clients (Peterson & 
Rom 1989). The RTB theory anticipates that states will compete with other neighboring states 
to avoid being “welfare magnets” due to their more generous public benefits. Hence, they 
will closely monitor neighboring states when determining the current level of benefits for 
their welfare population (Bailey 2005; Bailey and Rom 2004; Figlio, Kolpin, & Reed 1999). 
The literature does not, however, find conclusive evidence of a race to the bottom 
phenomenon under welfare reform (Berry, Fording, & Hanson 2003).  
How much devolution occurred within a state under TANF depended upon how much 
responsibility a state had already given to the localities before the implementation of 
PRWORA. Prior to the passage of PRWORA, 15 states had locally administered AFDC 
programs, and 35 states had state-administered programs (Gainsborough 2003; Watson & 
Gold 1997). After the reform, significant changes occurred in eight states (California, 
Colorado, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, and Wisconsin) that 
previously had county administered programs. In these states, counties gained additional 
authority and discretion under TANF. Some states did not devolve the responsibility to local 
governments. Instead, they created local or regional advisory boards. Though in some cases 
these advisory boards have local government representation, the emphasis is usually on 
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business representation, local community groups, and service providers. These states link 
welfare function to workforce development in the state. The states where this type of 
devolution occurred are Arkansas, Tennessee, Utah, Florida, Michigan, and Texas. In eight 
states, significant devolution occurred after PRWORA, and, in six states, welfare 
responsibility was given to the workforce development boards. Thus, fourteen states currently 
provide TANF implementation responsibility through the local authority (Kim & Fording 
2010). These states are referred to as the “SOD states” in this article.  
 
Effect of Devolution 
What is known regarding the effects of this devolution? Devolution of policymaking authority 
increases perceptions of successful policy outcomes at the subnational level for county 
officials (Cho, Kelleher, Wright, & Yackee 2005). Under the flexibility of the reform, states 
with a greater proportion of African American clients on welfare adopted more stringent 
policies (e.g., stricter sanctioning policies, shorter time limits, and family cap policies) than 
the states with a lower proportion of African Americans on welfare. Likewise, the 
relationships among the political climate, the racial-ethnic composition of welfare caseloads, 
and program implementation is well documented in the literature (Fording, Soss, & Schram 
2007; Keiser, Mueser, & Choi 2004; Sheely 2012; Soss, Schram, Fording, & Houser 2009; 
Soss, Schram, Vartanian, & O’Brien 2001) providing evidence that racial minorities may 
suffer due to strict welfare rules and their implementation (Abramovitz 2006). 
In a closely related study, Kim and Fording (2010) focus on SOD and TANF 
implementation in a state-level analysis and found that SOD states experienced a greater 
degree of caseload decline than non-SOD states. Also, SOD states were more likely to use 
punitive policies such as sanctions. Thus, SOD might lead to the more restrictive 
implementation of TANF rules. 
 
Research Design 
Data 
This study uses a uniquely constructed data set comprised of the data from the National 
Survey of America's Families (NSAF) combined with data from University of Kentucky 
Center for Poverty Research (UKCPR) National Welfare data, and the Welfare Rules 
Database (WRD). The Urban Institute conducted NSAF as part of the Assessing New 
Federalism project. NSAF provides a comprehensive look at the well-being of children and 
non-elderly adults and reveals sometimes-striking differences among the 13 states studied in 
depth. The survey provides quantitative measures of child, adult, and family well-being in 
America, with an emphasis on persons in low-income families. Though 13 states in the survey 
(Alabama, Massachusetts, New Jersey Washington, California, Michigan, New York, 
Wisconsin, Colorado, Minnesota, Texas, Florida, and Mississippi) were selected for intensive 
sampling, the data is representative of the US after combining observations from the 13 states 
with the rest of the nation. Conducted in three rounds—1997, 1999, and 2002—to gather 
information on more than 100,000 people and more than 40,000 families across the country, 
NSAF gives researchers tools to track national trends during that period, drawing on detailed 
and comprehensive information about low-income parents and their children. It also provides 
detailed information about TANF exits, which is the main variable of interest for this 
research. 
The NSAF data is further supplemented with state-level data, which are retrieved from 
three sources. State characteristics, such as unemployment rate, TANF caseload, etc., are 
retrieved from the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research (UKCPR) National 
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Welfare data, and the state TANF policies, such as sanctions and diversion payments, are 
retrieved from the Welfare Rules Database (WRD). The state political ideology score is 
adapted from the citizen and political ideology measure developed by Berry, Fording, 
Ringquist, Hanson, and Klarner (2010). 
 
Variable Creation  
In the empirical model, administrative exclusion is denoted by the variable administrative 
exit. The variable categorizes exits from a welfare program for an administrative or a non-
administrative reason. The NSAF asks questions about the reason why a client exited a 
welfare program. It does not provide an insight into program entry issues. Hence, consistent 
with Brodkin and Majmundar (2010), the dependent variable in this study is “the reason for 
exiting welfare.” The reasons are coded as administrative and non-administrative to create a 
binomial dependent variable. The exit can happen in two ways. Either a welfare office can 
remove a client for various reasons, or a client can choose to leave welfare. Thus, the sample 
includes non-missing observations of all working-age adults (18-64) who exited welfare in 
either way, with a sample size of 4,685.  Like Brodkin and Majmundar (2010), reasons for 
exiting welfare are coded based on rule violation and administrative problems to create the 
dependent variable administrative exit. 
The reason for exiting welfare is coded as an administrative exit if a client cited any 
of the following reason for exiting welfare: “Did not follow program rules,’’ ‘‘Administrative 
problems/mix up,” “Didn’t want or need/too much hassle/system too frustrating.” The welfare 
exit is coded as a non-administrative exit if a client cited one of the following reasons for 
exiting welfare: ‘‘Earnings had increased,’’ ‘‘Assets were too high,’’ ‘‘Reached end of time 
limit,’’ ‘‘Received money from another source,’’ ‘‘Change in family situation,’’ ‘‘Moved,’’ 
‘‘Got a job,’’ ‘‘Same job, worked more hours, or got a raise,’’ ‘‘Got a better job,’’ 
‘‘Married/remarried,’’ ‘‘Moved in with family,’’ ‘‘Moved to another county/state,’’ ‘‘Did not 
want it or need it/uninterested,’’ ‘‘Earnings too high,’’ and ‘‘Income too high.” 
Second Order Devolution (SOD) states are coded based on Gainsborough (2003), Kim 
(2008), and Kim and Fording’s (2010) classification to create a binomial independent 
variable. Fourteen states were coded as SOD states. They are California, Colorado, Maryland, 
Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Wisconsin, Arkansas, Tennessee, Utah, 
Florida, Michigan, and Texas. 
In 1997, 12.33 percent of welfare exits were attributed to administrative reasons. In 
1999, 15.31percent of exits were for administrative reasons, and in 2002, 3.33 percent of exits 
were attributed to administrative reasons. 
 
Theory and Research Hypothesis 
To understand how the implementation of welfare policy differs across SOD and non-SOD 
states, this study focuses on the relationship between administrative exclusion and SOD. It 
builds on two previous studies by Brodkin and Majmundar (2010) and Kim and Fording 
(2010) and extends the analysis further.  
Brodkin and Majmundar (2010) developed a framework where formal rules, informal 
rules, and governance work together to create exclusion. It assessed the effect of 
administrative exclusion on caseload decline and found that clients in higher caseload 
reduction states are likely to exit welfare due to administrative exclusion. 
The second study by Kim and Fording (2010), tests two main hypotheses. First is the 
efficiency hypothesis, which predicts that the SOD states will have better TANF program 
outcomes than the non-SOD states because of a greater discretionary power granted to local 
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administrators and case managers. The second hypothesis is the stringency hypothesis. 
According to this hypothesis, local administrators and case managers have greater incentive 
to use policy tools, such as sanctions, to discourage clients from continued use of TANF 
benefits. Thus, under the SOD, caseload will decline due to the punitive use of TANF 
implementation. This happens due to the financial and administrative structure of TANF 
programs in an SOD state.  Under the SOD, some local or regional jurisdictions receive block 
grants from the state. This generates pressure on the county or the regional board, since they 
have to pay 100 percent of the welfare cost beyond the state’s contribution. Additionally, 
some states reward their counties for savings in the welfare program. Another concern in 
SOD states is the political pressure and competition among counties to avoid an in-flow of 
poor people and the loss of business and tax revenue. Because of these financial incentives 
and political pressures, counties in SOD states are more likely to use punitive policies to 
reduce the TANF caseload, and these states experience greater TANF caseload decline than 
the non-SOD states. Kim and Fording (2010) found evidence that the SOD states are also 
more likely to use punitive measures, such as sanctions.  Thus, building on these two previous 
studies, the central hypothesis of this article is that the SOD states, as compared to the non-
SOD states, are more likely to use administrative exclusion to reduce welfare caseloads. 
  
Empirical Model 
The dependent variable administrative exit is a binary variable that shows how a client exited 
the welfare program and is coded as 1/0. The study focuses on assessing the probability of 
exiting a welfare program for an administrative reason for a client who resides in a SOD state. 
The most commonly used methodological practice for binary dependent variables is a linear 
probability model (LPM) (Wooldridge 2016). However, LPM suffers from two main 
limitations: first, the fitted probabilities can be less than zero or greater than one and, 
secondly, the partial effect of any variable in the level form remains constant (Wooldridge 
2016). To overcome these limitations, a more sophisticated binary response model, such as 
logistic regression, can be utilized.  This study uses logistic regression  to estimate equation 
1 below, along with clustered standard errors, and state and year fixed effects. 
 
Yist = β0ist+β1Xist+β2Zist+βQst+φs+ψt+ εist        [1]  
   
Where Yist is the indicator of administrative exit and equals 1 if an individual (i) who 
resided in the state (s) and exited welfare due to administrative reason in the year (t). Xist is 
the indicator SOD residence, equals 1 if, a client resides in a SOD state. It is the main 
independent variable of interest. Z is the vector of the demographic controls, which include 
race (white is the omitted category), Hispanic ethnicity, gender (compared to female), age, 
single (widowed/ separated/ divorced/ never married) relative to married, educational 
attainment (compared to high school dropout), and the number of dependent children. Q is 
the vector of state-level controls that include the state unemployment rate, state political 
ideology, a state’s sanctioning policy (compared to a full sanction), the presence of diversion 
payment (compared to no diversion payment), and welfare caseload in a state. φs is the state 
fixed effect, ψt is the year fixed effect, and εist is the error term. To explore if there is a 
connection between SOD residence, race, and administrative exit, the study uses another 
specification focusing on the interaction between race and SOD residence to estimate 
equation 2 below.   
 
Yist = β0ist+β1Xist+β2Zist+β3Qst+ β4 Xist * Black +φs+ ψt+ εist   [2] 
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Here, β4 is the coefficient of the interaction term between race and SOD. The 
interaction between Black*SOD compared to White*SOD is the main variable of interest. 
The literature finds evidence of a negative relationship between the type of welfare program 
and the racial composition of welfare caseload, and, hence, this interaction assesses the 
connection between client race and living in a SOD state. Along with the full sample, three 
subgroups are also analyzed. They are low income (up to 150 percent of Federal Poverty 
Level or FPL), low education (high school and less), and single mothers, as they represent a 
high-risk population for welfare participation. 
 
Results 
This results section describes summary statistics and interprets the results for the 
logistic regression. Table 1 describes the summary statistics for the full sample and three 
subgroups.  
The sample consists largely of single women. The average age is 32, and the number 
of dependent children on an average is 2. Seventy-one percent of the sample consists of poor 
(100% of FPL) and near-poor (150 percent of FPL), while 18.15 percent of the sample 
consists of individuals in deep poverty (50% of FPL). 
Table 2 describes aggregated state-level characteristics comparing SOD and non-SOD 
states. The average state unemployment rate is 4.73 percent, and the average welfare caseload 
is 55,000. Seventy-eight percent of the states have partial sanctions, and 60 percent of the 
states have adopted diversion payments. Eleven percent of administrative exits take place in 
SOD states, while 10.38 percent of administrative exits happen in non-SOD states.  
Table 3, column 1 shows that for the working-age population, living in a SOD state 
has no significant effect on the probability of an administrative exit. The probability of 
administrative exit is higher for singles than married (2.7 percentage points), and Hispanics 
have a higher chance of administrative exit (3.4 percentage points). As compared to white 
clients, both Black and Asian clients have a higher likelihood of an administrative exit (3.4 
percentage points and 16-percentage points, respectfully). Since both Asian and Black clients 
exit the welfare caseload for violation of rules or other administrative problems at a higher 
rate, it appears that such administrative problems affect non-white clients more often than 
their white counterparts, indicating that welfare sanctions may affect races differently. Race 
effects of this analysis are consistent with the literature. As compared to clients with no high 
school education, high school education reduces the chance of an administrative exit by 5.9 
percentage points. None of the state level controls is significant, indicating that, except SOD, 
other state-level policies, including the sanctioning regime, presence of diversion payments, 
and state unemployment rate, do not have a statistically significant effect on administrative 
exclusion. 
Among the remaining three subgroups, for low income mothers and single mothers, 
living in an SOD state increases the likelihood of an administrative exit by 10.6 percentage 
points and 7 percentage points, respectively. In the case of the low income and low education 
sample, race, ethnicity, education, and marital status are associated with administrative exit 
in the expected direction, consistent with the literature (Brodkin & Majmundar 2010). As 
compared to married clients, single clients have a higher likelihood of administrative exit. 
Hispanics and non-white clients have a higher likelihood of administrative exit. Education 
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Table 1: Individual Level Descriptive Statistics 
 All  
 
 Low 
Income  
 Low 
Education  
 Single 
Mothers  
 
 (N = 4,685) (N = 3,097) (N = 4,461) (N = 2,209) 
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Administrative Exit  10.8  12.4  10.83  12.22 
Race         
   White 3,055 65.21 1,874 60.51 2,910 65.23 1,241 56.18 
   Black 1,403 29.95 1,080 34.87 1,341 30.06 884 40.02 
   Asian 63 1.34 33 1.07 53 1.19 20 0.91 
   Other 164 3.5 110 3.55 157 3.52 64 2.9 
Marital Status         
   Married 2,402 51.27 1,454 46.95 2,276 51.02 - - 
   Single 2,283 48.73 1,643 53.05 2,185 48.98   
Gender         
   Male 1,254 26.77 690 22.28 1,178 26.41 - - 
   Female 3,431 73.23 2,407 77.72 3,283 73.59   
Ethnicity         
   Hispanic 740 15.8 513 16.56 715 16.03 305 13.81 
   Non-Hispanic 3,945 84.2 2,584 83.44 3,746 83.97 1,904 86.19 
Education         
   Less than High 
School 
1,207 25.76 902 29.12 1,207 27.06 516 23.36 
   High School/GED 3,254 69.46 2,089 67.45 3,254 72.94 1,600 72.43 
   BA or Higher 224 4.78 106 3.42 - - 93 4.21 
Income as a % of FPL        
Family Income < 
50% of FPL 
791 18.15 791 25.54 773 18.49 486 23.2 
50% <= Family 
Income <100 % of 
FPL 
1,244 28.54 1,244 40.17 1,196 28.61 658 31.41 
100% < = Family 
Income < 150% of 
FPL 
1,062 24.36 1,062 34.29 1,022 24.45 454 21.67 
150% <= Family 
Income <200% of 
FPL 
680 15.6 - - 638 15.26 279 13.32 
200% <=Family 
Income <300% of 
FPL 
582 13.35 - - 551 13.18 218 10.41 
         
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Children under 18 2.35 1.28 2.49 1.32 2.37 1.29 2.21 1.24 
Age 31.98 8.60 32.01 8.59 31.85 8.58 30.25 8.24 
Source: Author’s tabulation of data from NSAF, 1997, 1999, 2002. 
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remains a predictor of administrative exit where clients with lower than high-school education 
exit TANF at a higher rate compared to clients with more than high school education. In the 
case of single mothers, along with race, ethnicity, and education, the number of dependent 
children have a significant effect on administrative exit. Every additional child increases the 
likelihood of an administrative exit by 1.1 percentage point. For single mothers, the state 
unemployment rate affects administrative exits. For every 1 percentage point increase in the 
state unemployment rate, the chance of administrative exit for this group increases by 5.9 
percentage points. 
Annual administrative exits in this study range from 3 to 15 percent, providing 
estimates comparable to a previous study by Pavetti et al. (2003). A review of the literature 
on TANF sanctioning policies conducted by Pavetti et al. (2003) found that studies of closed 
welfare cases reported sanctioning rates ranging from 10 to 28 percent.  While the specific 
effect of SOD residence on administrative exits in the current study is small, it is important 
to note the timing of the NSAF data collection. The NSAF data were collected right after the 
welfare reform, when the country experienced economic expansion.  Ziliak, Figlio, Davis, 
and Connolly (2000) attribute a 66 percent decline in AFDC/TANF caseload to the economic 
expansion. Thus, it is possible that due to macroeconomic growth, TANF clients exited the 
program due to non-administrative reasons, as reported in the NSAF data. However, such an 
assessment of client welfare exits must be done during the periods of economic decline, such 
as during the Great Recession. Studies of TANF find that TANF did not respond to client  
 
Table 2: State Level Descriptive Statistics 
 All (N = 153) SOD (N = 42) Non-SOD(N=111) 
Administrative Exit Percent  Percent   Percent 
 10.8  11.01   10.38 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
       
Unemployment Rate 4.73 1.18 4.89 1.24 4.66 1.16 
Welfare Caseload 55,932.20 10,0811.10 120994.5 169910.4 31314.03 32479.72 
Political Ideology 
Score 
46.37 13.39 47.78 14.52 45.84 12.97 
 Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Sanction       
   Full 35 22.88 10 23.81 25 22.52 
   Partial 118 77.12 32 76.19 86 77.48 
Diversion Payment       
   Yes 60 39.22 24 57.14 36 32.43 
   No 93 60.78 18 43.86 75 67.57 
Source: Author’s tabulation of data from UKCPR and WRD for 1997, 1999, 2002. 
Note: Political Ideology score for DC is unavailable. 
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need during the Great Recession compared to other safety net programs, such as SNAP and 
EITC (Pavetti & Rosenbaum 2010; Hall 2015; Schott 2016). Therefore, it is important for 
future studies to carefully assess welfare exits during times of low economic activity and a 
high unemployment rate to understand further the administrative vs. non-administrative 
factors affecting welfare exits. 
 
Table 3: Logistic Regression Model of Administrative Exclusion (APE Reported) 
Predictors of Administrative Exit All Low Income Low Education Single Mother 
SOD 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.07 
 (0.05) 0.06 (0.05) (0.04)* 
Male 0.01 0.01 0.01  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
Hispanic 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 
 (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.03) 
Single 0.03 0.02 0.03  
 (0.02)* (0.02) (0.02)*  
High School Diploma -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 
 (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** 
BA or More -0.05 -0.05  -0.07 
 (0.03) (0.05)  (0.04) 
Asian 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.27 
 (0.07)*** (0.11)** (0.07)*** (0.14)*** 
Black 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 
 (0.02)** (0.02)* (0.02)** (0.02)** 
Other -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 
 (0.02)** (0.02)** (0.02)** (0.04) 
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)* 
Child under18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)* 
Unemployment Rate 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)* 
AFDC/TANF Caseload 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Sanction 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Diversion Payment 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Political Ideology 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -1.33 -3.52 -1.22 -3.37 
 (2.11) (2.23) (2.06) (1.54)** 
Observations 4,537 2,993 4,315 2,123 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses, clustered around the state. The results control 
for year and state fixed effects, which are not shown in the table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
 
Since the results find that non-white welfare clients have a higher likelihood of exiting 
a welfare program than their white counterparts, the connection between SOD residence, race, 
specifically black/African American race, and administrative exclusion is further explored. 
Results in Table 4 find no statistically significant effect of interaction between race and SOD 
on administrative exit, indicating no cumulative effect of race and SOD residence on 
administrative exit. 
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Table 4: Logistics Regression Model of Administrative Exit using the interaction 
between race and SOD (APE Reported) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Predictors of 
Administrative Exit 
All Low Income Low 
Education 
Single 
Mother 
SOD 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.04 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Male 0.01 0.01 0.01  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
Hispanic 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 
 (0.01)*** (0.02)** (0.01)*** (0.03) 
Single 0.03 0.02 0.03  
 (0.02)* (0.02) (0.02)*  
High School -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 
 (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** 
BA or More -0.05 -0.05  -0.07 
 (0.03) (0.05)  (0.04) 
Asian 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.28 
 (0.07)*** (0.11)** (0.08)*** (0.14)*** 
Black 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
Other -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 
 (0.02)** (0.02)** (0.02)** (0.04) 
SOD X Black 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)* 
Child Under 18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)* 
Unemployment Rate 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)* 
AFDC/TANF Caseload 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Sanction 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Diversion Payment 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Political Ideology 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -1.16 -3.43 -1.06 -3.15 
 (2.12) (2.21) (2.08) (1.55)** 
Observations 4,537 2,993 4,315 2,123 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses, clustered around the state. The results control 
for year and state fixed effects, which are not shown in the table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Discussion 
Results for this analysis show that, for low-income clients and single mothers, 
residence in a SOD state increases the likelihood of a welfare exit due to rule violations and 
bureaucratic hassles, as reflected in administrative exits. For these two sub-samples, which 
are representative of vulnerable populations that face more barriers to employment, SOD 
residency predicts administrative exit likelihoods at levels similar to race, ethnicity, marital 
status, and educational attainment. It is unclear why the devolution of authority results in 
TANF clients exiting the program for administrative reasons at higher rates. Moreover, 
administrative exclusion reflects bureaucratic choices and rules violations—implying some 
of these individuals and families may be leaving without having achieved self-sufficiency. 
One of the reasons behind decentralization of welfare policy was to provide program 
responsibility to states, under the assumption that they know their welfare population better 
and will design welfare programs that are suitable to the needs of their clients. Given such 
power, states have the ability to be more generous, but also have the ability to be stricter. 
The policy implications of this phenomenon are clear. Recently, federal policymakers 
have proposed block granting other safety net programs, such as SNAP (Ryan 2014). Results 
of this analysis suggest that the effects of devolved authority under block grants need to be 
assessed carefully before block granting other federal safety net programs. 
The federal government evaluates a state’s TANF performance using work 
participation rates as a performance measure—a decision that has been criticized on two main 
grounds (Hahn, Golden, & Edelman 2012). First, many states cannot meet work participation 
rates given the narrow definition of work-related activities and high level of expected work 
participation rates. Secondly, since states get credit for work participation rates by reducing 
cash assistance caseloads for reasons other than a change in eligibility requirements 
(Government Accountability Office 2010), it creates direct incentives for states to do so. The 
results of this analysis point toward distorted incentives created within the system due to the 
performance measure, namely the work participation rate, as it relates to caseload reduction. 
This study finds that single mothers and low-income TANF clients leave welfare at higher 
rates for administrative reasons, indicating that for some vulnerable populations who may 
need more support to transition into the labor market, TANF policies and rules may not be 
working. Thus, for some TANF clients, work support and rules may be operating effectively, 
but, for others, TANF rules appear to be more punitive. 
Race and ethnicity remain important predictors for administrative exclusion. Studies 
have shown that Hispanic and Black women face a higher rate of sanctions as compared to 
white women (Schram, Soss, Fording, & Houser 2009; Monnat 2010). Thus, findings of race 
and ethnicity as predictors of administrative exclusion are consistent with the literature. This 
brings forward an important discussion about the role of street-level bureaucrats as state 
agents in the implementation of welfare policy, which is well documented in the literature 
(Meyer, Glaser, & MacDonald 1998; Riccucci, Meyers, Lurie, & Han 2004; Sandfort 2000). 
How these front-line workers understand and implement TANF rules have direct 
consequences for clients whose well-being depends on these caseworkers and managers. For 
example, if a caseworker interprets case management as “meeting quotas,” then the most 
important aspect of the job becomes meeting those numbers in order to remain compliant 
with the program rules (Brodkin 1997). 
Caseworkers develop their own methods to cope with work conditions, such as access 
to resources, caseload size, and performance measures. They also include their personal 
assumptions and experiences in their work practices. Thus, both organizational conditions 
and personal values influence the way in which caseworkers deal with clients (Hasenfeld 
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2010). Given the importance of caseworkers’ role in the implementation of welfare rules and 
policies, future research should explore this connection between client race, caseworker 
practices, administrative exclusion, and the SOD. 
The performance measure of work participation rates and caseload reduction credit 
are tied closely together and appear—in some cases—to be displacing the goal of client 
economic self-sufficiency. This brings forward the issue of goal displacement within welfare 
governance. Bohte and Meier (2000) discuss the main issue with evaluating agency 
performance based on output rather than the outcome. They conclude that agencies give more 
importance to the performance measure, and focus on generating numbers to satisfy those 
output targets, rather than focusing on achieving important policy outcomes, such as 
economic self-sufficiency in the case of welfare clients, creating the problem of goal 
displacement. 
Performance measures can lead to achieving small-term, measurable goals instead of 
long-term, more difficult goals (Marschke 2001; Moynihan 2010).  In the case of welfare 
reform, such performance measures focus mainly on caseload decline. However, rewards for 
caseload decline are not balanced by penalties for failure to provide adequate access for 
clients, creating skewed informal practices focused on the performance measure of caseload 
reduction (Brodkin 2007). To resolve this issue of goal displacement within welfare 
programs, a better performance measure might be the number of clients successfully 
employed through the TANF program and the number of clients who remained out of the 
system due to continued employment, focusing more on the goal of self-sufficiency than on 
caseload reduction (Bitler & Hoynes 2015; Hahn et al. 2012).   
In the early period after the passage of PRWORA, declining caseload was considered 
one of the indicators of program success. This, in part, was driven by the strong labor market, 
which absorbed single mothers at previously unseen rates. However, very broad and 
competing policy goals and the myriad programs developed under PRWORA make it difficult 
to assess its success. Understanding specific issues of implementation under PRWORA will 
help policymakers understand which administrative factors are influencing the measured 
program outcome, which continues to be the work participation rate. If other program rules 
become more important than self-sufficient clients, then program rules need to be revised to 
improve implementation outcomes other than caseload reduction. If the policy goal is to help 
people move “from welfare to work,” the case outcome focus should become “work” versus 
the number of cases closed and dollars saved in the process. 
 
Limitations and Future Research  
It appears that by creating additional barriers to successful transition to the labor market 
through many administrative rules and procedures, welfare bureaucracies may be limiting 
access for those who need assistance the most (Brodkin, Fuqua, & Waxman 2005). However, 
the results of this study should be interpreted with caution. This study uses the NSAF data, 
which include observations from 1997, 1999, and 2002. Thus, this analysis is limited to the 
period right after the passage of PRWORA during a major economic expansion and expansion 
of the EITC at the federal level. The effects need to be explored in during major economic 
downturns, such as the Great Recession. During the Great Recession, the unemployment rate 
increased by up to 10 percent. Though families faced job loss and struggled to meet basic 
needs, TANF caseloads did not increase immediately, and, as a program, it was not as 
effective as other safety net programs, such as SNAP (Hall 2015). Hence, future research 
should explore the connection between administrative exclusion and SOD to understand this 
link over a longer time period, with multiple business cycles. This study also explores the 
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connection between race and SOD. However, future research could explore a connection 
between SOD, education, and race to understand how these conditions together affect 
administrative exclusion. 
We have passed the 20th anniversary of welfare reform, and it is important to critically 
examine the relationship between devolution and welfare reform, especially given that federal 
policymakers have proposed block granting other safety net programs, such as SNAP (Ryan 
2014), it is imperative to settle still unanswered questions about the long-run self-sufficiency 
of welfare clients, and how block-granted programs may help or hinder this goal. 
Policymakers should therefore carefully assess the effect of devolution and block granting 
under current welfare policy. 
 
Rhucha Samudra is an Assistant Professor of Public Administration at the College at 
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